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ABSTRACT 
Is  forgiveness  a  necessary  precondition  for  reconciliation  in  transitional  processes?  By 
exploring the relationship between forgiveness,  defined as  a  moral  attitude and a metaphysical  
impossibility,  and reconciliation -an empty signifier-  this  presentation will  reveal  the paradoxes  
intrinsic  to  the  restorative model  of  justice.  Standing  from a  critical  perspective on  the  global  
industry of transitional justice, it will interrogate the basic principles over which the restorative  
model is built; namely, the cathartic value attributed to testimony, the extend of the possibilities of 
enunciation within the space of truth commissions as technologies of truth,  the epistemological 
value attributed to testimony and the commodification of archived memory;  lastly, the intricate 
relationship between forgiving, forgetting and reconciling. By analyzing the operation of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, this presentation will argue that transitional policies 
contribute in very particular contexts to the orchestration of forms of structural oblivion.
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I will like to start with Jean Amery’s reflection when is presented the ethical dilemma that  
occupied  Simon  Wiesenthal`s  mind  and  lead  to  the  publication  of  The  Sunflower,  on  the 
possibilities and limits of forgiveness (1969). Simon Wiesenthal was captive in a Nazi labour camp, 
one day he is called to the Nazi Hospital; a nurse asks him if he is Jew and then he is led to the 
bedside of a dying SS member. The young soldier wants to be absolved by a Jew for his multiple 
and  horrifying  crimes.  Wiesenthal  acted  sympathetically  but  could  not  pronounce  words  of 
forgiveness and remained silent. However, the question whether he acted rightly remained for him a  
dilemma.  The  Sunflower,  on the possibilities  and limits  of  forgiveness compiles the  answers  of 
important  figures who have thought about  the question of  forgiveness,  including among others 
Archbishop  Desmond  Tutu,  Primo  Levi  and  Jean  Amery.  The  response  of  Amery based  on  a 
rejection of “any metaphysical morality” (1969:106), is that the dilemma is a theological one, and  
therefore for him is meaningless. If Wiesenthal had been magnanimous and had forgiven the SS  
soldier or had he refused to do so, either ways the decision was politically irrelevant. However, he 
emphasizes:  “(P)olitically,  I  do  not  want  to  hear  anything  of  forgiveness!”  (1997:108;  my 
emphasis). The reluctance of Amery to attend to the question of forgiveness and to its insertion into 
the political sphere is to be understood as a result of his primordial concern with  Justice  and the 
remembrance of the affront. This position will become clearer along the presentation; however,  it 
leads  us  to  the  centre  of  the  argument  I  will  be  advancing:  there  is  a  confusion  between 
reconciliation and forgiveness in transitional politics which potentially contributes oblivion and new 
ways of victimization. 
The Restorative model of justice has become a privileged way of dealing with past atrocities  
in the last  decades.  Within this new approach there is  a renewed concern with the memory of  
suffering,  consistent  with  a  major  paradigmatic  change  in  the  historiographic  production,  now 
dominated  by  the  study  of  memory  (Ricoeur,  2004,  Huyssen,  2003  Young,  1993).  The 
representation of the past in the realm of memory implies a series of significant changes. To start 
with, it  results in a growing concern for narratives and testimonies (Ricoeur, 2004 White,1992;  
Troulliot, 1995) so sharp that academics have started to discuss the potentialities and dangers of an 
“era of the witness” (Wieviorka, 2006) and its characteristic “culture of victimization” (Huyssen, 
2003). Secondly, deeply influenced by the psychoanalytical notion of trauma, it places particular 
attention to memory of suffering (Huyssen, 2003). Lastly, it draws attention to the selective nature 
of memory, which cannot be understood without its counterpart, forgetting. 
Within this episteme, formed in the intersection of the neo-enlightened humanism of Human Rights 
Discourse  and  the  Politics  of  Memory,  Restorative  justice  appears  as  a  commendable  model, 
focused on the victim and its suffering. As opposed to looking for punishment (as supports of the 
approach would have retributive justice), it seeks to restore the damage that was inflicted: firstly, it  
publicly  acknowledges  the  victim's  suffering  -an  act  considered  to  be  precondition  for 
reconciliation;  secondly,  seeks  to  amend  past  injustices  –  through  apologies,  restitutions  and 
reparations. Finally, it envisages the restoration of individual dignity, in as it publicly acknowledges 
the  wrongness  of  perpetrated  crimes  (Kellenback,  2001).  This  combination  of  testimonial,  
acknowledgment and apologies is considered to have a significant therapeutic value, in as it is held 
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to restore individual dignity. It is likewise considered to “heal” the nation and to hence yield into  
national reconciliation. 
In this line of though,  truth commissions have been implemented along the globe as early as the 
1990’s - in various distinct historical contexts - in order to disclose the “truth” about  past human 
rights  violations,  provide spaces  for  victims  to  regain  their  lost  dignity and ultimately achieve 
reconciliation in what are referred to as –post-conflict societies. They are the best-suited institutions 
to help countries in transition to leave their past behind and move on to the future, in as they offer 
spaces in which individuals are able to narrate their experiences of violence and brutality, which 
according to the restorative principle,  results  in personal  healing.  As technologies of truth,  this  
commissions attempt to establish a victim-centred representation of the past and to hence uncover  
the truths of past human rights violations based on the value of testimony.
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
Subsequent  to  the  dismantlement  of  the  apartheid,  the  notion  of  reconciliation came  to 
occupy a prominent role in South-African transitional justice, mainly through the operations of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The TRC became a paradigm for the application of 
the restorative approach to justice. As stated by the Chair of the South African Truth Commission, 
Archbishop Desmond Tutu in his Final Report, the commission believed that “there is another kind  
of justice - a restorative justice which is concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting  
imbalances, restoring broken relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation. Such justice  
focuses on the experience of victims; hence the importance of reparation.” (Tutu, 1998) In view of 
this, the TRC was grounded on a restorative conception of justice, focused primarily on alleviating  
the suffering of victims by healing and testimony and restoring the broken relationship between  
victims and perpetrators for the sake of social reconciliation. The TRC's definition of reconciliation 
was a  complex one,  consistent  of  three different  elements:  reconciliation with “painful  truths”, 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, and reconciliation at a social level which referred 
to overcoming racial differences (Moon, 2008:39). With regard to reconciliation at the individual 
level, both victims and perpetrators were encouraged to adapt to the major political goal which was  
national reconciliation. Former should do so by forgiving and leaving their grudges behind, and 
latter by expressing regret and manifesting a change of moral (Kellenback, 2001: Reagan 2008). 
Perpetrators  were  exhorted  to  recognize  the  wrongness  of  their  deeds  and  to  both  manifest 
contrition and a willingness to repair. In these order ideas, the public hearings became a scenario for  
the performance of contrition. Because of the influence of Christian ethics in the “new enlightened 
moralities” (Barkans, 2000:308-09), truth commissions generally, and the TRC particulary, are thus 
spaces for the theatrical performance of forgiveness (Sontag, 1966). This was particularly true for 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, which had a mas massive media impact  
(Cole, 2007).
Reconciliation and Forgiveness in the TRC 
“The oppression was bad, but what is much worse, what makes me even more angry, is that they are trying to  
dictate my forgiveness” (Personal Interview to  Kalukwe Mawila In Verwoerd, 2003: 264).
“No government can forgive. Pause. Only I can forgive. Pause. And I am not ready to forgive” (Interview in  
Garton Ash, 1997: 36).
The religious and moralist discourse of the TRC was grounded on a consecration of the virtue of  
forgiveness. The main booster of forgiveness and reconciliation in South Africa was the Archbishop 
Desmond Tutu, chair of the TRC. Tutu considered acts of forgiveness to be “gifts of generosity” 
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which in the face of evil would show the good nature of people (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R,  
2001: xii). For Tutu forgiveness was a precondition to Reconciliation. In fact, he would frequently 
affirm that  “without  forgiveness  there  was  no future”  (Tutu,  1999),  and  argue  that  forgiveness 
shows  the  goodness  of  which  humans  are  capable  of.  For  this  reason,  he  would  think  about 
forgiveness as a manifestation of magnanimity, and hence belonging to the realm of the sacred.  
“Exhilarated” by forgiveness, he would express his celebrated phrase: “Please let us keep quiet  
because we are in the presence of something holy” (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R, 2001: xii).  
Forgiveness in Tutu’s rhetoric is informed by a common definition of the concept opposed to anger, 
bitterness and desire of revenge (Tutu Ed. Helmick, R & Petersen R, 2001: xii). The exaltation of  
forgiveness as an almost divine virtue was parallel with the dismissal of resentment as a valid moral  
sentiment: 
God has given us a great gift, ubuntu … Ubuntu says I am human only because you are  
human. If I undermine your humanity, I deshumanize myself. You must do what you can to  
maintain this great harmony, which is perpetually undermined by resentment, anger, desire  
for vengeance. That’s why African Jurisprudence is restorative rather than retributive (Tutu,  
D Mail and Guardian, 17 March 1996 In Wilson, 2001:9).
Many have argued that the TRC did not induce forgiveness, but that it provided the opportunity for 
victims to forgive, if they were willing to do so: “It was not the intention of the commission to  
demand forgiveness and pressurize people to forgive, but to create an opportunity where this could  
take place for those who were able and ready to do so” (Audrey, 2001: 356). This claim, however,  
contrasts with the praxis of the TRC and the politics of memory of post-apartheid South Africa: 
“Personal bitterness is irrelevant. It is a luxury that we, as individuals and as country, simply  
cannot afford” (Nelson Mandela In Graibill, 2002:21). 
The discourse on Reconciliation promoted by the TRC made alternative narratives to forgiveness 
difficult,  if  not  impossible.  The  South-African  TRC  was  blatantly  promoting  forgiveness  and 
directly encouraging victims to reconcile with the perpetrators. The image of the unforgiving person 
came to be vilified, whereas those who were inclined to renounce anger and achieve reconciliation 
were held in high esteem, as “forgiving brothers and sisters” (Tutu, 1966); commissioners would 
pressurize victims,  reaffirming that the main objective of the TRC experience was to ultimately 
achieve reconciliation through forgiveness: reconciliation and forgiveness were evoked in the vast 
majority of hearings, 70% according to the manual counting of the HRV (Verdoolaege, 2006: 74). 
Forgiveness was encouraged by tacitly praising someone every time he or she would express signs  
of such inclination. For instance, by statements such as: “I have been particularly touched by your  
last paragraph where you say that you are not driven by vengeance and a desire of revenge, but you  
are  gladdened  to  coming  before  the  commission,  because  you  have  got  this  quest  to  real  
reconciliation” (HRV hearing, East London, June 11, 1997 in Brudholm, 2008; my emphasis).  
Contrary to this, testimonies that expressed the refusal to reconcile and the desire to punish were 
condemned. Thomas Brudholm's analysis of resentment in the TRC is one of the few academic 
researches which engage with an analysis of the value of negative sentiments and particularly the 
virtue of resentment. He provides striking evidence of how during the hearings the primordial aim 
of nation-building was imposed to victims which manifested reluctance to accept the Amnesty Law. 
It is evident from the way in which the commissioners led the questions that a refusal to accept  
amnesty would be detrimental to the process of reconciliation, and therefore would cause a major 
harm to the country. 
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Commissioner: Let me put it this way; do you read newspapers and watch TV, not so?
Answer: Yes I do read newspapers and I do watch television. 
Question: I assume that you know about this Truth and Reconciliation Commission that is  
going on, of which Amnesty is part thereof?
Answer: Yes I heard
Question:  (…)  “Do  you  know  this  is  done  by  the  Government  to  foster  or  to  promote  
reconciliation in the country? 
Answer: Yes I do know that
Question: What is your attitude about this reconciliation process? 
Answer: I don’t have any comment on that one. 
Question: Do you belief in reconciliation?
Answer: Yes I do believe (Brudholm, 2008:31). 
The  TRC  in  South  Africa  as  the  institution  leading  and  embodying  the  restorative  notion  of  
Reconciliation, ultimately served to silence the claims of justice of victims that did not accept the 
model and rejected the amnesty law. The notion of Reconciliation served as a moral dispositive to 
legitimize the teleology of transition. When analysing the complex negotiations of justice implied in 
transitional justice the voice of the academic Mahmood Mamdani still echoes when questioning 
from a moral perspective the effect of the TRC: “If truth has replaced justice in South Africa, has 
reconciliation then turned into an embrace of evil? “ (Mamdani, 2002: 146). 
Critical Perspectives on Reconciliation 
Is  there  an  intrinsic  relationship  between  forgiveness  and  Reconciliation?  There  are 
innumerable criticisms to the shortcomings of the restorative Justice approach. Mainly, they point  
out to the subordination of the notion of Justice to a meta-narrative of Reconciliation and Truth. I 
will  argue that the imposition of Forgiveness is a form in which rightful claims of justice from 
victims who are not willing to reconcile are de-legitimized.  For this reason it is important to de-
construct the notion of Forgiveness in order to understand in a more comprehensive way victim's 
testimonies and claims for Justice. If restorative justice is an approach to Justice as it claims that is  
mainly concerned with the damaged inflicted and the experience of suffering of the victim, the  
boosting of forgiveness is a way of imposing the weight of reconciliation on the shoulders of the  
victims so that they become “victims of reconciliation” (Moon, 2009).  It is not within the scope of  
this  paper  to  analyse  the  antagonism between  retributive  and  the  restorative  model  to  Justice. 
Nonetheless, I will argue that the commission dismissed the claims of individuals who demanded 
retribution, by imposing a moral narrative  in which forgiveness was exalted as a humane virtue and 
desires for retribution where associated with a limited notion of resentment and vengeance. In the 
last chapter it will become evident how in the TRC hearings the testimonies of victims who were 
not willing to forgive were excluded and how they were pressured to overcome their feelings for the 
sake of “social harmony”.  
Todorov  distinction  between  Justice,  politics,  morality  and  heroism  is  enlightening  to 
interpret  the  relationship  between  forgiveness  and  politics  of  Reconciliation  in  South  Africa. 
According to Todorov  moral action is directed towards other individuals, is fundamentally inter-
subjective.  When  the  action  ceases  to  be  directed  to  an  individual  and  has  as  its  object  an 
abstraction,  then  it  is  a  form  of  heroism  (Todorov,  2000:288)  The  abstraction  being  liberty, 
communism, even humanity, or why not reconciliation. The thesis I am advancing in this paper is  
that  effectively,  Reconciliation as it  was promulgated by the TRC is a meta-narrative grounded 
wrongly in a notion of forgiveness which is informed by Christian ethics, and asks from victims to  
become heroes, leaves the weight of the future of South Africa in the capacity of the victims to  
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overcome their negative sentiments, to forego their claims of justice, in order to achieve a major 
political objective. In the process, the notion of Justice is subordinated to the primordial political  
goal of national reconciliation. 
The TRC failed to acknowledge and incorporate the victim's claims to justice. Since, not all  
victims seek health and reconciliation, those who didn’t accept the official rethoric were left out and 
had their claims ignored or dismissed as erratic desires of vengeance. This denial was largely a 
consequence of the above exposed notions of forgiveness and resentment practiced by the TRC. By 
condemning claims of retributive justice and sublimating forgiveness, victims were left with a bitter 
taste of injustice, exerted by a system which promoted amnesty and failed to provide justice to the  
victims:  .  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  pressure  to  forgive  and  encounter  directly  the  perpetrator,  
produced more psychological damage to victims that were not willing to forgive. The following 
apart of a speech by a father whose young daughter had died in the massacre of Heidelberg Tavern,  
addressed to amnesty seekers in an amnesty hearing in Cape Town in 1997 reflects a feeling that 
was common to many victims (Bruhdolm, 2008: 187):  “I have not been able to, despite extensive  
therapy and counselling, shed the anger, rage, guilt, feelings of revenge and helpless desperation  
art  the system that  allows murderers to escape punishment” (Graybill,  2002: 45 In Bruhdolm,  
2008:21). However, these claims were dismissed and stigmatized as deriving from lust for revenge. 
“The hearings were structured in such a way that any expression of a desire of revenge would have  
been seen out  of  place” (Wilson, 2001:120). Negative sentiments were seen as obstacles to the 
healing  process,  since  forgiveness  was  considered  as  being  liberating  for  the  victim.  For  Tutu 
forgiveness  was  actually the  victim´s  duty,  unconditional  and  independent  of  manifestations  of 
regret by the perpetrator,  although the latter were permanently encouraged (Wilson, 2001, Tutu, 
2004). 
Among the  four  types  of  truth  defined by the  TRC,  the fourth  one was  concerned with 
Healing and restorative truth. This corresponds to the main premise of restorative justice which 
thought of healing the victim by giving it back the dignity that it had lost. This premise is founded 
on a conception of testimony as therapeutic. The claim that testimonies serve to provide “healing” is 
a position that Ricoeur defended in Memory, History and Remembering (2004). Therein he argued 
that the TRC was successful in providing a space for victims, who undeniably achieved “catharsis” 
as a result  of their accounts of suffering and of the public acknowledgement of latter (Ricoeur, 
2004:483).  However,  the  therapeutic  value  of  testimony proved  to  be  a  wrong  generalization. 
Firstly,  the premise was overarching and did not recognize individual differences, neither in the 
reactions towards suffering nor in the private forms of grieving and mourning. The literature shows 
that some effectively thanked the commission and manifested relief. Nonetheless, statistically this 
was not true for the majority of cases:  the Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture in 
Cape Town calculates that  approximately 60 % of the victims expressed an increased sense of  
unease after having given testimony (Hayner, 2001:144). As most of the victims testified, rendering 
public  testimony reawakened painful  and  overpowering memories  that,  in  the  aftermath  of  the 
hearings, would sometimes result in the reappearance of physical symptoms of distress (Hayner, 
2001). The therapeutic discourse of restorative justice served to marginalizes those who demanded 
justice instead of reconciliation by fetishizing their positions as weak and unhealthy for themselves 
and for the social body (Nagy, 2008: 336) 
The pressure to forgive actually caused more distressed in those who were reluctant  to  
accept the therapeutic discourse on reconciliation. The psychologist Herman refers to forgiveness as 
a fantasy which becomes an obstacle for mourning: it can be a “cruel torture since it remains out of 
reach of most individual human beings” (Herman, 1992: In Brudholm, 2008). As opposed to being a 
condition for “healing”, imposing forgiveness is a cause of more anger in the face of the dismissal 
of individual opinions. In addition to this, the discourse of restorative justice, according to which 
victims  need  to  achieve  healing,  results  in  a  reduction  of  the  experiences  of  victims  to  a 
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pathological and ambiguous notion of “Trauma” (Humphrey, 2002).  As the psychologist Brandon 
Hamber stated in a personal interview by Wilson in 1996: “the word catharsis gets used too often in 
the TRC. There is a perception that as long as a person is crying then healing must be taking place”  
(Wilson, 2001:121). The hearings were designed as rituals of healing based on the performance of 
forgiveness.   In opposition, anger and resentment were interpreted as signs of an ill psyche and a 
weak morality. 
Dislocating Forgiveness from Reconciliation 
“Forgiveness is mad, and it should remain in the madness of the impossible” (Derrida, 2001:39)
You know, you say you are sorry, but on the other hand, it is also empty words (Paul Van Vuuren  In  
Krog, 2000:117)
 
Derrida’s philosophical deconstruction of the notion of Forgiveness as an Aporia, which is 
an intrinsic impossibility, is suggestive to the need to analyze the way it is co-opted by political,  
moral and juridical discourses. It provides a basis to de-naturalize and deconstruct the social and 
political  uses  of  Forgiveness in  projects  of  national  reconstruction and nation-building,  task of 
particular importance in the  current political sphere, in which Forgiveness and official apologies 
are the way of re-establishing diplomatic relationships and the basis of political reconciliation.
What is the meaning of the response of a mother who is asked if she forgives the killer of his  
daughter or the torturer of his son? The response of Jacques Derrida is as follows: “Whether she 
says ‘I forgive you’ or ‘I don’t forgive’ in either case I am not sure of understanding. I am even sure 
of not understanding and in any case I have nothing to say” (2001: 55). Through this example he is 
alluding to the inaccessible realm of experience to which the issue of forgiveness belongs. I strongly 
endorse this definition of “Pure Forgiveness” as an Aporia (2001) since it focuses our attention to  
the  fact  that  as  soon  as  forgiveness  is  performed  and  used  as  a  means  of  restoration  and 
“normalization” it ceases to be forgiveness. This is because forgiveness belongs to the realm of the  
impossible  since  one  can  only  forgive  what  is  unforgivable2.  Therefore  it  “should  remain 
exceptional and extraordinary (…) as if it interrupted the historical course of historical temporality” 
(Derrida, 2001:32). Furthermore, since it is unconditional it follows that it cannot be demanded or 
interchanged; it does not obey to an instrumental or economic logic, on the contrary, it operates 
under the logic of the  gift  (Mauss, 1954). Derrida’s emphasis on the pure notion of forgiveness, 
which “forgives only the unforgivable” (Derrida, 2001:32-33) points out to an important issue to be 
considered in the rising field of what has been denominated “the politics memory”. Namely, that  
forgiveness should be divorced from sovereignty (2001: 59) 
Reconciliation:  An encounter
)
The equation of retributive justice and legal punishment with vengeance and retaliation is  
nowhere  particular  to  the  South  African  interpretation.  On the  contrary,  it  is  one  of  the  main 
fallacies and weaknesses of the restorative model as it was theoretically conceived. The restorative  
model of Justice was born as an alternative model of criminal law (Uprimny, 2006) critical to the 
model  of  retributive  justice  which  proposers  of  the  alternative  considered  repressive  and 
inoperative.  Bringing judicial punishment to the level of retaliation, defenders of the notion of 
2 Paul Ricoeur devoted his entire work to the analysis of  the relationship between memory, history and 
forgetting (2004). He agrees with Derrida on the impossibility of forgiveness and its unconditional nature,  
since “the fault is in its essence unforgivable” (Ricoeur, 2004:466). 
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restoration  argued for  a  model  oriented  towards  reconciliation  and social  harmony rather  than 
individual punishment (Minow, 1998; Teitel, 2003).  This at turn requires a morality of forgiveness,  
in which the parts involved declare a willingness to come to terms, forgive and ask for forgiveness 
for the benefit of society as a whole. However, the problem arises when this model, virtuous in its  
local application, is co-opted as a Transitional Justice mechanism in its own. Whereas the model  
concerns  criminal  Law, Transitional  Justice  is  by definition a  normative model  for  exceptional  
spaces characterized by the commission of crimes against humanity. When, as in South Africa, the 
differences between transitional justice and restorative justice are confounded, a very particular and 
dangerous  ethic  emerges,  one that  demands  forgiveness  in  the  face  of  brutality and conditions 
political to individual reconciliation.
I am against the reconciliation as seen from The Hague perspective. I never wronged anyone.  
I did nothing wrong. Reconciliation means that we have to meet half way, but that's offensive.  
I was wronged and almost my entire family was killed. I care about justice and truth” (Tim  
Judah, 2004: 25 In Brudholm, 2008: 198) 
The  quest  for  forgiveness,  and  the  subsequent  rejection  of  resentment,  is  a  highly 
problematic approach in transitional contexts.   Unlike suggested by religious and psychological 
discourses, it does not necessarily engender relief and absolution from the shadows of the past. On 
the contrary, efforts to overcome resentment can at times represent an enormous burden. Consider 
the anxieties that the humanist Primo Levi faced at the possibility of meeting former Nazi High  
commanders.  His  empathic  approach  -  based  on  the  recognition  of  a  common humanity-,  his 
profound knowledge on human morality and clarity on the nuances of the relationship between so-
called “victims” and “perpetrators”, could not dissipate the anxiety caused in the face of such an  
encounter. Albeit his rejection of all sort of Manichaeism,  Levi experiments a profound confusion 
and unease when confronted with the possibility of meeting Albert Speer and Müller (Todorov, 
2000; Levi, 1988) readily admitting his relief after the cancellation of the meeting with Speer. We 
thus see, overcoming distance in an effort to understand, might be a profoundly disturbing ambition,  
even though a very legitimate one. Tzvetan Todorov in his beautiful book “Facing the extreme”  
(2000)  suggests provocatively that Levi`s suicide could have been a manifestation of vicarious 
guilt,  the result of the internalization of the desire to annihilate by the recognition of the common  
humanity  of  the  victim  and  the  tormentor  (Todorov,  2000).  Furthermore,  he  interprets  Levi´s 
intellectual dialogue with Jean Amery (1912-1978) as a sign of an intimate struggle. 
In the same line, authors like Vetlesen (1994) would argue that Primo Levi's rejection of 
Amery`s  defence  of  Resentment  was  a  fight  that  Levi  was  having  with  himself,  since  he  had 
forbidden himself to hold to resentments. Certainly, there are cases in which relationships are better  
not restored; distances better kept, and resentments rather maintained. Amery, who on this point was  
radically opposed to Levi,  recognized the value of this  distance, a distance he never wanted to 
bridge as “ it was filled with death corpses” (Amery, 1980). The holocaust survivor and intellectual  
Jean  Amery  was  driven  by  the  felt  responsibility  as  a  witness  to  bear  testimony.  Hence  his 
philosophical exploration of the victim's subjective experience, most prominent in his collection of 
Essays entitled “At the Mind's  Limits” (1980).  His writing moves beyond a mere testimony of  
suffering. Speaking as a victim that examines its resentments (Amery 1980: 63), Amery in fact sets 
out  to  defend  a  psychic  state  and  justify  it  against  the  main  corpus  of  psychological  and 
philosophical literature. 
“I  rebel:  against  my  past,  against  history,  and  against  a  present  that  places  the  
incomprehensible in the cold storage of history and thus falsifies it in a revolting way”  
(Amery, 1980:VI)
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Amery's stance was deeply influenced by the memory politics of the young German democracy of 
the 50's and 60's. By the time he had published his essays in 1966, the German people was growing 
ever more reluctant to engage with the past of Nazi Germany, while the deeds of the Third Reich 
seemed to increasingly lose their ability to affect and interest the public. The time for the “pathos of  
reconciliation” had dawned (Amery 1980:  65).  In  a  collective  will  to  overcome the  past,  and 
encouraged  by  the  wealth  of  the  German  “Wirtschaftswunder”,  the  german  people  longed  to 
embrace a glorious future in an unison chorus of hope and oblivion. Faced with both the memory of 
national-socialist crimes and the public desire to bury them in the annals of history, Amery was 
outraged by what  he considered an inadmissible foreclosure of the past.  According to him,  the 
person with resentment is not allowed to look towards the future and easily “join the unison peace 
chorus all  around him” (1980:69).  Instead of lifting the gaze towards a brighter  future,  Amery 
defends resentment as a legitimate moral sentiment. 
His writing hence not only surges from a reaction to past deeds; it  simultaneously represents a  
response  to  a  society that  in  the  aftermath of  a  destructive  war  is  excessively concerned with 
“coming to  terms  with  the  past”  and reconfiguring  imperialist  and  nationalist  sentiments.  It  is 
against this excessive will to leave the past behind that resentments blows its horns. Analogically,  
the research on post- TRC South Africa evidences that even though this institution had a major 
impact in South African´s re-making of History, as an institution, as an archive, it never revealed 
The  Apartheid  as  the  oppressive  system  of  segregation  it  actually  was  (Grunebaum,  2010).  
Transitional Justice when confounded with restorative Justice, obscures structural violence by its  
medico-juridical interpretation of history. Albeit the call for memory and recognition of past crimes  
in transitional contexts, the archivization of history that results from the praxis of this Commissions 
as  technologies  of  truth  objectifies  the  past,  and  separates  it  from the  present  and  the  future  
(Grunebaum, 2010; Feldman, 2004). 
It  is relevant and pertinent to review Amery´s moral philosophy and his defence of negative  
sentiments in the contemporary world characterized by this “urge for memory” (Derrida, 2011). 
Resentment, which in Aristotelian Philosophy was conceived as a sentiment that shows people self
´respect and esteem, echoes in Amery´s philosophy, the voice of those who fight against oblivion 
and comfortable forgetting; of those who rebel against a society which accepts with remarkable  
facility the horrors it engendered (Amery, 1980:70).  In this view, resentment acquires value and 
virtue as a moral sentiment which asserts one´s inconformity with evil and victim´s  dignity:  
Whoever lazily and cheaply forgives, subjugates himself to the social and biological  
time-sense  which  is  also  called  the  “natural  one”  (…)  Man  has  the  privilege  to  
declare himself  to be in disagreement with every natural occurrence, including the  
biological healing that time brings about (1980:72).
Amery is conscious about the difficulties of legitimating resentment. His is a position that 
largely contrasts with dominant ideas, notably those advanced by Nietzsche. According to latter 
(Nietzsche, 1987), resentment evidences a slave morality. It is the position of an individual, who in  
the past was unable to act and defend himself, and the feeling of those who “are denied genuine  
reaction, that of the deed, and who compensate for it through an imaginary revenge” (Nietzsche, 
1987).  Resentment,  thus,  offers  nothing  but  an illusion of  agency.  Its  passivity and its  grudge 
against the tormentors are what Nietzsche conceives as a sick, bitter and narcissistic anchoring in  
the past. This grudge should be superseded by the virtues of forgetting. For it is through forgetting,  
through its ability to disregard past misdeeds and weaknesses, that man restores its strength and that 
man signals a “superabundance of power which is flexible, formative, healing and can make one 
forget (Nietzsche, 1994: 23-24). Nietzsche thus does not condition healing to forgiveness, but to 
forgetting. 
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Amery contrasts this view of resentment, yet agreeing on both the points that resentment is 
a translocation of time and that the victim is captive of its tormented past. Being captured in the  
painful memory of the past is, however, not in the least reprehensible. On the contrary, it would be 
immoral  to  condition morality to the natural  pass of time and let  this  dissipate the urgency of 
memory  (Amery,  1980).  Resentment  “proposes  an  inversion  of  the  social  conception  of  the  
biological time as healing”, notably because this conception is “not only extra-moral,  but also  
anti-moral  in  character”  (Amery  1980:  72).  Hence  Amery's  declaration  that  forgetting  and 
forgiveness  are  inadmissible  and blatantly immoral,  and  his  rejection  of  the  healing  properties  
attributed to the pass of time. Pain stays present in the victim, since what happened “cannot be so 
easily accepted. Nothing has healed, and what perhaps was already on the point of healing in 1964  
is  bursting  open  again  as  an  infected  wound”.  In  view  of  this,  to  forgive  and  to  forget  is  
inadmissible and blatantly immoral (Amery, 2008).
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Conclusive Remarks 
The main purpose of this paper was to investigate to what extent truth commissions assist in 
acknowledging the experience of suffering. This was analysed in the case of South Africa and the  
role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). The reason for choosing this particular 
commission is that it is considered to be an exemplary model of an institution which deals with past 
atrocities, since it focuses on the victims and their experience of pain. The commission put forward 
a complex notion of truth; one which was particularly concerned with the experience of the victim 
and the narrative dimension of testimony. 
This model  is  promising since it  offers the possibility of an official  recognition of the victims’ 
suffering,  and  a  promise  of  archiving victims’ truth  as  part  of  the  national  collective  memory. 
However, the result of the research shows that victims attended the hearings as representatives of a  
community and not as individuals. Hence, the phenomenological experience of the victims in the 
TRC hearings was not acknowledged. In fact, the testimonies were conditioned to a major political  
project of national reconciliation. As a conclusion, national reconciliation was made dependant on 
individual  reconciliation,  that  is,  on the reconciliation between “victims” and “perpetrators”.  In 
view of this,  forgiveness was formulated as precondition for the establishment of a new South-
African  nation.  The  TRC  hearings,  consequently,  became  the  theatre  in  which  apologies  and 
expressions of regret were performed.
All in all, the research evidenced that the conditioning of reconciliation to forgiveness imposes a  
civic  and  moral  duty  on  victims.  They  thus  become  victims  of  the  reconciliatory  discourse.  
Furthermore, the therapeutic approach towards the experience of suffering and the metaphors of  
reconciliation  depict  resentment  as  an  impediment  to  “social  harmony”.  Combined  with  the 
confusion  between  reconciliation  and  forgiveness,  this  rhetoric  limited  the  discursive  space  in  
which the experience could be recounted. 
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